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Abstract 
We here argue that study of governance systems within increasingly pluralist health care 
systems needs to be broadened beyond traditionally public sector orientated literature. We 
develop an initial typology of multiple governance systems within the English health care 
sector and derive exploratory questions to inform future empirical investigation. We add to 
existing literature by considering the co existence of – and possible tensions between - 
multiple governance systems in a pluralised health and social care system.  
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Introduction: The Pluralization of Health Care – What Are Implications for Its Governance? 
For several decades now, traditionally public sector orientated health care systems in various 
developed countries have moved towards more diverse forms of service provision. Health 
policy in England, under various governments, has long favoured developing a more mixed 
economy on the supply side (1). Similar pluralisation is evident in other jurisdictions such as 
Nordic countries including Sweden, Denmark and Finland, with traditionally large public 
sectors (2).  
 
Such pluralization raises the problem of coordination between the increased number of 
service providers and indeed commissioners (3). This problem can be studied at different 
levels of analysis. There has been a long standing interest in the creation of integrated care 
pathways (4) at micro or service delivery level, designed to bring multiple professionals 
together across whole care processes. But the meso or organizational level should also be 
considered, as third sector and private sector organizations take on enhanced significance in 
service delivery.  It is possible that the behaviour of professionals in such organizations is (to 
some extent) steered from the top, from their Boards of Directors and Trustees, which set 
overall strategic direction. These Boards may be in turn be influenced by their organizations’ 
accountability lines and ownership structures. 
 
The purpose of this small scale personal review is to: (i) identify some texts within various 
streams of governance literature which go beyond the usual narrow focus on public sector 
boards; (ii) to construct a typology of the different governance systems which now co exist in 
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a pluralist health care field and (iii) to explore possible implications and questions for a future 
empirical study. 
 
Throughout the paper, we use the term ‘governance’ in two distinct ways but both uses are 
important. Chambers and Cornforth (5) draw a distinction between organizational level 
governance (of particular interest to them) and wider system level governance (p99), writing 
in their piece: ‘the focus here is on the organizational level and the term ‘corporate 
governance’ will be used to refer to the structures, systems and processes concerned with 
ensuring the overall direction, control and accountability of an organization.’ Organizational 
governance here refers to the structure and control systems apparent at the strategic apex of 
the individual organization, such as a Board of Directors. 
 
‘System level governance’, by contrast,  refers a broader political science based analysis of 
the shift within the United Kingdom away from ‘government’ within an unitary nation state 
to a more fragmented, diffuse and arms’ length form of ‘governance’ (6, 7). We are interested 
in both levels: a concrete example of potential systems level governance in the English health 
care sector is area based coordinating machinery known as Health and Well Being Boards, 
set up by the 2012 Health and Social Care Act. 
 
The governance perspective directs attention towards the role of Boards or analogous 
principals in setting overall frameworks and importantly differs from alternative perspectives 
on decision making, such as: the leadership role of the individual CEO (8); the collective 
influence of the health care professions operating from below (9) or the dynamics of multi 
disciplinary teams at service delivery level (10).  
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Approach: An Initial Review 
This is an initial and small scale review and deliberately not a systematic review. Our 
objective here is to broaden out from a relatively narrow stream of sectorally specific 
literature on NHS (National Health Service) Boards and open up novel streams of enquiry in 
a preliminary and creative way. We wished to explore wider steams of governance literature 
which might be relevant to pluralist health care systems and discuss them together in one 
paper, thereby helping to link traditionally distinct literature streams. . 
 
We undertook an initial hand search of recent editions (over the last ten years) of a restricted 
set of relevant journals (e.g. Voluntas; British Journal of Management; Public 
Administration) and also used the authors’ pre existing knowledge of key authors. We 
snowballed out from these early texts to other references. We here present an initial overview 
and map of the terrain and  hope to develop this early personal review further in future work. 
 
The English NHS and Its Changing Corporate Governance Systems 
We start by considering the historically well developed literature on NHS health authority 
boards which developed as a subtheme within a wider public administration based literature 
exploring accountability lines in public sector agencies. Most (but not all) NHS board 
members were historically nominated by ministers rather than being directly elected, unlike 
local authority councillors (11).  Until the 1990 corporate governance reforms (see below), 
however, NHS District Health Authorities (DHAs) were relatively large and broadly based, 
consisting of four members appointed by Local Authorities (i.e. councillors); five reserved 
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places (one each for: a hospital consultant; a GP; a nurse; a trade unionist and a medical 
school representative) and six or so ‘generalists’ appointed centrally (11). 
 
Day and Klein’s (11) study of these pre 1990 DHAs found they were often problematic 
settings for their members to influence. Formally, DHA members were accountable upwards 
to the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) and then the Secretary of State (the lead 
Minister); informally, many members reported a (vague) sense of accountability downwards 
to their local community. DHA members interviewed also often resented the hegemony of the 
local Senior Management Team (SMT), feeling they lacked both the information and the 
power to enact their oversight role effectively. Day and Klein (11were sceptical of their 
ability to achieve ‘role clarity’ when compared (for example) to more focussed water 
authority boards. Day and Klein (11) called for a deliberative process around the developing 
of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to help DHA members make more informed 
judgements about the overall ‘performance’ of the organization they were nominally 
directing. 
 
The health care organizations studied by Day and Klein (11) have since been reorganised, 
often many times! One difference is indeed a significant growth of KPIs on the lines they 
recommended. Organizational level data are now summarised and made visible by system 
regulators (Monitor and Care Quality Commission). Do such data enable current day Non 
Executive Directors (NEDs) to make more informed assessments about overall performance 
levels? A second development has been the creation of NHS Foundation Trusts (NHS FTs) 
(2004 onwards) at local level, and the abolition of DHAs. NHS FTs can be seen as 
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autonomised ‘delivery’ organizations and may potentially be less diffuse than their 
predecessors and therefore their governance may be somewhat less complex.  
 
NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts 
Significant and enduring corporate governance reforms in the 1990 NHS and Community 
Care Act moved NHS organizations away from the old public administration model of larger 
boards  (11) towards the smaller and more ‘business like’ boards of the Anglo Saxon private 
limited firm (Plc). The Act built on the earlier development of internal line management 
capacity recommended by Griffiths (12) to strengthen the governance level further. The 
original NHS Trust model (1990) favoured one main board (13), as opposed to the two board 
model with greater stakeholder representation found in Germany (14). Trade union and local 
authority representation was culled and Non Executive Directors (NEDs) (note the linguistic 
shift from the old public administration based term of ‘members’) appointed, often with 
private sector experience. The new boards were encouraged to set strategic direction and 
ensure high performance within a single autonomized provider organization, although still 
subject to external regulation. A second stream of generic strategic management literature on 
private sector boards now became more relevant (15) to these more market facing and 
competitive NHS Trusts. They originally operated in an internal quasi market within the NHS 
(1990-97). However, the recent 2012 Health and Social Care Act has stimulated more market 
entry from private and third sector entrants so a more open market is developing in some 
sectors (e.g. in community health services). The 2012 Act also relaxed the cap on privately 
generated income for NHSFTs so they are becoming more of a ‘hybrid’ between a public 
agency and private firm. They can make and retain a surplus from private income generating 
activities, although there are (as yet) no shareholders or dividends to pay. NHS Trust NEDs 
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(from 1990) were appointed by the Department of Health or later its advisory agencies on the 
basis of personal expertise and drive and not elected and  previous representation from 
nominated local authority councillors and medical and allied representatives at DHA level 
was weakened (16). FT boards became smaller, tighter, and supposedly more ‘strategic’. 
 
This ‘democratic deficit’ was criticised by some political scientists such as Skelcher (17) as 
an (important) component of a larger trend in UK public management reform which had 
expanded the scope of non elected, arm’s length, agencies (‘quangos’) across the public 
services and shrunk the powers of elected local government in favour of a greater role for 
central government and its agencies. Much of local government was of course controlled by 
opposition political parties, including the Labour Party so these governance reforms also cut 
back on the political opposition’s power base. This third and more critical literature stream 
maps the changing shape of the contemporary state (including its manifestations in the health 
care sector), exploring the alleged growth of quangos and a weakening of direct democratic 
accountability at local level. The health care state is construed here as one which is appointed 
rather than directly elected but also one in charge of major and visible public services and 
large budgets. The focus in this literature is on championing locally based democratic forms 
of governance as opposed to a ‘patronage state’ or indeed other forms of participation, such 
as Public and Patient Involvement (PPI), (18) which do not however have a direct presence at 
Board level. 
 
Perhaps as a response to this critique, reforms brought in during in the New Labour period 
(1997/2010) rebalanced at least somewhat the governance of NHS Foundation Trusts (set up 
from 2004 onwards) by creating a second board of Governors drawn from community and 
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staff groupings alongside the appointed main board. These governors related to different 
constituencies of members (14). The Governors formally had the power to appoint the non 
executive chair and NEDs. These NHS FTs (19, 20) have been described as taking the form 
of a not for profit, public benefit corporation and as based on a mutual ownership model. 
Some of their ‘constituencies’ held elections and there was now to be at least one governor 
representing Local Authorities. 
 
The main board could now in principle be held accountable downwards to local Governors as 
well as upwards to the national regulator (Monitor), acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. 
The new Governors, however, still seem  to be struggling to negotiate an effective role and to 
be under utilized (14), suggesting that the main Trust board may remain as a more significant 
power centre, partly because it retains legal accountability 
 
In short, the current governance arrangements of NHS FTs mix various elements within 
‘hybrid’ forms. The small, private sector style and supposedly strategic Boards of the 1990 
reforms have been retained and they still strongly face ‘upwards’ to the regulator (Monitor). 
At the same time, they now also face downwards to their Governors, although this 
downwards accountability appears as yet still weakly developed. They remain public bodies 
without shareholders, although they can make and retain surpluses and the cap on private 
income generation was relaxed in the 2012 Act. Some Trusts now have ambitious plans to 
develop private income streams, including at the international level so their private patients 
units are expanding and are becoming more ‘firm like’. NHS FTs are facing more open 
markets so it is unclear whether they will now adopt more competitive behaviours, or 
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whether they will instead seek to act as local coordinators or ‘system leaders’ and if so, what 
their capacity for systems thinking as opposed to a more competitive strategy is. 
 
The Governance of NHS Primary Care: Commissioners and Providers 
We now consider NHS primary care, which contains both commissioning and providing 
organizations. Between 1990 and 2012, various incarnations of NHS primary care 
commissioning organizations broadly adopted a similar model to NHS hospital Trusts, with 
non executive members and a non executive chair. However, there were here fewer executive 
members. Some literature which explored primary care boards found they were largely 
ineffective in setting a clear strategic direction (21).  
 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) (established by the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act) were designed to increase the influence of primary care health professionals on local 
commissioning and reduce managerial/bureaucratic control. CCG Boards have a high 
representation from GPs, and a lower non executive presence (a minimum of two lay 
members). They are membership based organizations representing all local general practices 
who elect representatives so they now have a ‘governing body’ model rather than a Board. 
We ask: will such a membership based organization behave in a more collective and 
consensus seeking way than a firm like one based on principal/agent (board/employee) 
relationships? 
 
Checkland et al (3) found the emergent CCGs (p9) faced in practice a ‘complex web of 
accountability relationships’. They still had a (strong) upwards accountability line to the 
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Department of Health and the sector regulator. They have also a downwards facing but 
weakly expressed line of accountability to their patients and local population. ‘CCGs are 
membership based organizations and this is said to be one of the key strengths of the new 
structures’ (Checkland et al,  p7) (3) yet downwards facing accountability lines to the local 
practices were as yet poorly specified. We clearly need to know more about how the 
governance of CCGs develops and how this distinctive membership based form of organizing 
(and opposed to a hierarchical form) plays out in practice. 
 
We also know little about the operation of governance systems within the general practices 
which provide frontline primary care services. Such settings are often professional 
partnership based organizations where senior professionals (usually GPs) are simultaneously 
owners, employers and managers. This professional partnership form is radically different 
from both conventional public agencies (where employees are salaried) and private firms 
owned by shareholders. Some GP practices have rapidly grown through mergers and 
acquisitions, perhaps acquiring more poorly performing practices, and are now large scale 
organizations with an extended group of partners (22). In addition, some General Practices 
are coming together within loose federations rather than formal mergers. 
 
The 1998 Primary Care Act liberalised workforce arrangements so non doctors (e.g. a nurse 
or practice managers) can now become partners (although numbers are still small). There has 
been a significant growth in the number of salaried GPs alongside traditional partners. So 
there are significant changes in the primary care workforce. Recent legislation (2010) also 
allows practices to become limited liability companies to limit partners’ potential liabilities 
and encourage more capital investment. Corporately owned chains and outsourcing 
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companies are now moving into English primary care, including Virgin care and SERCO 
(15), representing a significant new organizational form and one with more firm like 
governance systems. 
 
In a rare example of primary care orientated organizational research, Sheaff (23) suggests 
traditional primary care partnerships will seek to balance multiple objectives, satisfying 
partners’ expectations about income but also sensitive to professional opinions about the 
range and quality of services and sustaining collegial working. After undertaking case studies 
on decision making in these settings, Sheaff et al, (24) (p142) concluded: ‘the general 
practices we studied had a common sequence for decision making. Closed partners’ meetings 
first made a decision, followed by discussion with the employees, usually at periodic practice 
meetings. Internally, the partners’ meetings generally worked by consensus.’ Partnerships 
could also develop their own management style: the nurse led practice they studied, for 
example, had a more open style with strong consultation with salaried staff. McDonald et al 
(25) found that a new and more performance related contract had informally led to the 
emergence of so called ‘chaser groups’ of GPs who actively monitored the performance of 
staff, including partners, in meeting key income related targets. These ‘chasers’ were often 
(but not always) partners and often (but not always) members of local boards so that it was 
possible that there was some element of novelty in the construction of these ‘chaser’ roles. 
 
So we need more research on general practices’ governance. Are lead partner or even 
managing director roles emerging – especially in larger multi site practices - or is the old 
rotation principle surviving (Sheaff et al (24) found examples of both forms)? Are informal 
‘chaser’ groups of GPs also emerging (25)? How do groups of partners make strategic 
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decisions about the overall direction of the practice? Who becomes a partner and how? How 
do the big private firms now moving into primary care operate in governance terms? 
 
Boards in The Private Sector Firm 
We have argued that some NHS governance systems (e.g. NHS FTs) are primarily modelled 
on the Anglo Saxon Plc, albeit with minor recent rebalancing from German style stakeholder 
based models. So accessing studies of ‘effective boards’ in the private sector (26) might now 
be helpful to NHS FT Boards too. The ‘managerial hegemony’ thesis (27) in this literature on 
private sector firms, for example, has already been used within studies designed to assess the 
strategic impact of NHS NEDs (15, 16). 
 
Given marketization policies, various forms of private sector ownership are apparent in the 
current health care sector. Most obviously, private firms listed on the stock exchange and 
with shareholders who expect dividends play an increasing role in English health care 
delivery, including some large outsourcing firms (e.g. SERCO Plc). There is now also a well 
established private sector presence in long term nursing and residential care, with large chains 
emerging alongside traditional cottage industry provision (e.g. Four Seasons Health Care 
chain, recently bought by Terra Firma private equity). The presence of private equity funds in 
the nursing homes sector is then significant; although the market currently seems fragile. Of 
course, more traditional family based ownership structures may also persist (e.g. in smaller 
groupings of nursing and residential care homes). 
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Formally, company strategy in Plcs is set by the board, held accountable by its shareholders 
at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Within the Anglo Saxon model, shareholders are 
seen as more central than other stakeholders. So healthcare management scholars should now 
pay more attention to the substantial academic literature on corporate governance in Plcs, 
both on boards and their regulation. There is a need to consider spill over effects from reports 
of enquiry and reforms designed to improve corporate governance (27) in the private sector 
evident in the UK from the 1990s onwards, for the public sector, as similar reforms may 
diffuse across sectoral boundaries.  
 
So we conclude that the PLC based form is important, but we suggest other types of firm may 
also now be present in the health care sector. Is a distinctive governance effect exercised by 
private equity and venture capital funds, as in the nursing home sector? Do SMEs owned by 
families in the health care sector (e.g. smaller groupings of nursing or residential homes) 
behave in distinctive ways in governance terms? 
 
Recent academic work on NHS corporate governance reveals a helpful shift of perspective in 
now citing generic corporate governance texts as well as health sector based studies. 
Chambers’ (13) overview (also 28) thus helpfully reviews general theories of corporate 
governance, such as agency theory (where the board is the principal and senior managers 
their agents) and stewardship theory (where the board and managers work together in the 
long term interest of the company). Successive reforms to UK Plcs have tried to expand 
NEDs’ roles to ensure better governance. There is an increased academic interest in exploring 
board processes – and how NEDs can carve out real influence on boards – in private firms as 
well as a more legalistic focus on formal board structure (29, 30). Within the NHS, the more 
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micro level and interactionist ‘enactment’ perspective on board behaviour was explored by 
Freeman et al (31). 
 
In summary, we suggest we need more analyses of the governance of Plcs operating in the 
private health care sector and follow the operation of lines of accountability down to 
shareholders or their proxies (such as investment funds and financial advisers) (32, 33),   
considering how they affect important matters such as dividend policy or shareholder value 
(34). Other questions include: do the Boards of these Plcs in health care operate with a 
shareholder or stakeholder model? How do they interact with sectoral regulators and other 
non private sector players in the health and social care system?   
 
Local Government and The Direct Democratic Mode of Accountability 
Local government is a major and perhaps increasingly important partner for English health 
care in such important areas as: public health, adult social care and children’s services. The 
2012 Act transferred responsibility for the public health function to Local Authorities. New 
Local Authority based Health and Well Being Boards were set up and are charged with 
setting strategic direction across a geographic area. CCGs have members on these Boards and 
in formal terms should set their own priorities in response to these Boards’ strategic direction 
(3). 
 
However, accountability modes have been seen by some political scientists (35) as radically 
different in local government from the health care sector as its basic principle is the direct 
democratic election of councillors rather than indirect appointments of non executives from 
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ministers (as we consider further below). The system of party political control in English 
local government often ensures one majority political party forms an administration and seeks 
to implement a collective electoral mandate. In cases of poor performance, the national centre 
also finds it more difficult to replace elected political leaders than to remove appointed 
managers and Boards, as it readily can in the NHS. 
 
The governance model (28) in this sector is that elected members (councillors) work 
collectively as a non executive council, supported by professional and neutral officers. 
Reflecting disquiet about poor quality of decision making  in traditional committee based 
models, the UK Local Government Act (2000) proposed various reform models which all 
sought to increase levels of political/executive authority, such as a visible leader and a small 
cabinet of senior councillors with major policy briefs (e.g. Social Services) (28).  
 
Some political scientists (35) have criticized the growth of ‘quangos’ or the ‘appointed state’ 
apparent as a result of NPM reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. the removal of the New 
Universities from local government control in 1992 and their reconstruction as independent 
and autonomised corporations). Local government is seen as better in generating direct face 
to face democratic dialogue and accountability; bottom up feedback and community self 
governance than such autonomised and self standing agencies with their Boards appointed by 
the centre. One suggestion is that functions with significant policy responsibility (e.g. health) 
(36, p164) should be moved into the elected sector to enrich modes of accountability. 
 
However, some empirical studies – such as a 2003 study of governance across the North East 
region (36) - found still significant weaknesses in the democratic credibility – and hence 
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possibly legitimacy - of local government: for example, turnouts at elections were low and 
the candidate pool was narrow. In many (but not all) areas there was little effective electoral 
competition as many councils are ‘safe’ for a political party. Between elections, there might 
therefore be weak ‘downwards facing’ accountability from councillors to their voters. Given 
weak electoral competition and low voter turnout, councils’ political mandates may be seen 
as weak. However, some empirical work suggests fear of losses in forthcoming elections can 
act as a credible threat which spurs pre-emptive and self-initiated action by senior political 
leaders to improve council performance (37) and their own electoral prospects.  
 
This local government literature is widely informed by political science based thinking (35), 
often advocating enhanced democratic control and downsizing of appointed bodies or 
‘quangos’: ‘in our view, the basic issue is democratic control. Most, if not all the unelected 
bodies should be replaced by elected ones as a matter of principle to provide the basis for 
accountability’ (36, p37). There is an interest in stimulating ‘downwards facing’ modes of 
accountability and better developed citizen based (more extensive than restricted notions of 
consumer choice) participation (38). 
 
One implication is that current attempts to integrate health and social care provision (e.g. 
devolution to the Manchester region) (39) may need to handle tensions caused by the 
distinctive governance regimes and indeed electoral cycles in the different sectors involved. 
Empirical questions include: how are local authority Cabinet Members constructing their 
roles? How do they interact with health care? Has local government become more 
sophisticated in its downwards facing public consultation processes? 
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The Third Sector: The Role of Boards of Trustees 
Third sector organizations are often governed through an (unpaid) Board of Trustees. Of 
course, there is substantial variety between subgroups of third sector organizations. While 
many such organizations are small scale and locally based,  some others have become large 
scale and significant players in English health care, often working under contract to deliver 
services for NHS commissioners  (e.g. Age UK) (40). There have been attempts to 
professionalise the governance of the sector, with more codes of conduct being produced by 
national bodies and the Charity Commission exercising increasing oversight.  
 
One danger for third sector service providers is that they become over dependent on 
government funding and lose their core identity (41). The centrality of ‘mission’ here makes 
conventional models of corporate governance problematic. These organizations also have a 
frequent need to motivate their volunteer base. They lack both a profit motive and public 
sector based performance management systems as organizational disciplines. They also have 
sectorally specific income generation strategies (e.g. time limited campaigns; donations; 
charity shops) and growing flows of private income may push them towards becoming 
‘hybrids’ in both financial and governance terms (41), now trying to mix market like and 
voluntaristic principles (e.g. a commercial subboard which reports to a voluntristic main 
board). The growing literature on hybrid organizational forms (42) raises the question as to 
whether hybrid governance regimes are stable – especially where private income flows 
expand over and above charitable or public sources of funding – or whether one governance 
principle in the end becomes dominant.  
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English third sector organizations are typically governed by volunteer Boards of Trustees, as 
opposed to Boards of Directors, elected at AGMs by all members. These organizations are 
regulated by the UK Charities Commission. However governance weaknesses are empirically 
apparent. Small third sector organizations are vulnerable at both managerial and governance 
levels to over dependence on a small and static ‘inner circle’, often with succession planning 
issues (40). Survey based evidence that larger charities provide more support and training to 
board members (43) suggests that the consolidation now evident in the sector might produce 
larger and better governed organizations 
 
Concern about the robustness of these traditional governance structures is evident in  the 
recent Myners review (44) of the large UK based Cooperative group (following major 
financial losses) which urged it to move from traditional representative governance structures 
to a smaller, expert, board with stronger financial management. Third sector governance has 
historically been a relatively narrow academic field, but there are now calls from scholars to 
broaden its theoretical perspectives (45). 
 
Social enterprises represent a growing subsector within the third sector, where a diverse and 
indeed complex range of governance arrangements appears possible. Social enterprises may 
take the form of private firms with explicit social goals, normally governed by a Board of 
Directors or a founder owner in the case of a SME. They may also take the form of large 
trusts or philanthropic divisions of large firms, normally governed by Trustees. They could 
take the form of worker cooperatives (mutuals) or social cooperatives which involve both 
client and worker groups within the co production of services. They may finally represent 
another example of a ‘hybrid form’, for example, where a large NGO sets up a for profit 
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subsidiary for income generation purposes. Its for profit operations may then be ringfenced 
organizationally,  reporting to a sub board which then is subject to oversight from the main 
board of the NGO. Young (46) suggests both that the current empirically based literature on 
social  enterprises is thin and that theoretically it is possible that any such hybrid governance 
forms are unstable and that governance reverts to one dominant ideal type. 
 
Area based Coordinating mechanisms and processes 
The so called ‘network governance’ (NG) narrative of public and health management reform 
(7, 47), sponsored by post NPM authors and then New Labour governments (1997-2010), 
promoted more integrated and systemic approaches to public services delivery designed to 
unpick the fragmenting effects of earlier market/management led (‘New Public 
Management’) reforms sponsored by Conservative governments. Some of these NG reforms 
tried to reinforce the operation of a geographically based system of public services delivery. 
Within health care, a good example of such Network Governance reforms were the place 
based Health Action Zones (HAZs) of the early 2000s, although Bauld et al’s study (48) 
suggested  empirically they achieved only mixed results. Some other managed network forms 
in health care – such as the cancer networks that emerged as local responses in some areas in 
the mid 1990s, were inherited by New Labour in 1997 but then strongly developed and made 
mandatory (49, p74) by them – have however survived a review after the move back to 
Conservative led governments in 2010 and endured (49). Stoker (50) suggests a new model 
of ‘community governance’ may evolve where local authorities – as opposed to NHS FTs -  
take on broader roles as system developers, even where they lose responsibility for direct 
service provision. 
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Newly elected Conservative led governments in 2010 and again in 2015 re tilted English 
health policy back to marketization. So autonomised NHS FTs may possibly now retreat from 
collaboration and move back towards principles of competition. Nevertheless, there are still 
attempts to develop inter agency working, especially between health and social care. 
Specifically, the new Health and Well Being boards set up in 2013 should bring health and 
social care agencies together to consider local populations’ needs (51). While health care 
budgets have been relatively protected since 2010, however, local authority budgets 
(including adult social care) are under severe pressure, possibly encouraging a dysfunctional 
shift of the balance of care of older and other patients/clients from social to health care 
settings (despite official policy), especially into Accident and Emergency settings where is it 
is difficult to curtail direct access. This is also only the latest cycle of reform in a policy arena 
which has resisted various earlier attempts to promote more systemic working. 
 
There is now an emerging public health orientated literature on these Health and Well Being 
Boards which have been formally set up as statutory committees of local authorities. 
Coleman et al (2014) (52)’s study of 8 early ‘shadow’ boards suggested a number of difficult 
issues arose: (i) lack of executive power; (ii) unclear accountability lines; (iii) some tensions 
with primary care and CCGs; (iv) difficulties in getting local issues on overloaded agendas; 
(v) the lack of experience of NHS staff in handling overtly political arenas (e.g. change of 
party control after elections); and (vi) different planning, financing and governance systems 
in the different organizations involved. 
 
Marks et al (53)’s early study explored as one theme the organizational context of these 
Boards’ decision making, noting (p1201): ‘perhaps ironically given that local government is 
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often seen as the natural home for public health, the study exposed differences between NHS 
based public health and local authority public health in views over evidence, priority setting 
processes and the role of democratic decision making….’ . It was noted that both process 
values (views about accountability and participation) and content values (decision making 
criteria) strongly informed what were termed the ‘values and politics of public health.’ 
 
So we need more empirical evidence about how these coordinating Boards are now operating 
in practice and their influence levels, given they do not hold budgets or have line 
management power. From a governance perspective, we ask: are there ‘board interlocks’ 
present in the health and social care sector with a few well connected nominees on multiple 
boards, replicating what some private sector board literature suggests (54)?  Or do different 
subgroups of board members form with little interaction? Social Network analysis could be 
usefully employed to address these questions. 
 
While some traditionally influential health care providers (large NHS FTs) now claim to be 
local ‘system integrators’, is this claim accepted by partners or seen as just another claim and 
iteration in long standing institutional dominance? Are local authorities, instead, developing 
wider community governance roles (50) which then seek to incorporate the health sector? 
 
Finally, NHS England (2016) is encouraging health and social care leaders across local 
systems to come together to produce Sustainability and Transformation Plans to cope with 
intense productivity pressures. These new partnerships should also be studied once they have 
been fully set up. 
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Concluding Discussion 
Our key argument is that health management scholars interested in exploring the governance 
of more pluralist health care systems should broaden their analyses to go beyond: (i) the 
traditional focus on public services boards; and (ii) the already developing interest in boards 
of large firms; to include more literature on: (iii) professional partnership forms (e.g. primary 
care; dentistry); (iv) democratically based modes of accountability in local government (e.g. 
social care); (v) the role of Trustees in governing third sector organizations; (vi) the nature of 
any whole area coordinating machinery across local systems. 
 
While we have here explored the governance of the English system, similar issues arise in 
other health systems where the traditional public sector is also in long term decline. The 
Nordic countries are here good comparators as they shift from their old government centric 
model (2, 55, 56, 57). Other countries – such as Germany – display alternative models of 
stakeholder based governance in private firms which are of interest and may have influenced 
the redesign of NHS FTs governance systems. 
 
This early scoping paper should hopefully inform the design of a projected empirically 
grounded study on the operation of multiple governance systems in one large English health 
and social care economy with a history of trying to develop integrated care across 
organizational boundaries. Table 1 picks out some questions which arise from this initial 
literature review which might inform an empirical study of the operation of multiple 
governance systems in this sector. This projected empirical study hopes to focus on services 
for older people as a multi organizational policy field of major policy and resource 
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importance. This early literature review indicates there is a need for such empirical studies in 
contemporary pluralised settings and on a whole area basis to explore the interactions 
between different governance systems which goes beyond the conventional focus on micro 
level service delivery level interactions. 
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Table 1: Questions Arising From the Literature Review for a Possible Study of Governance Systems in A 
Pluralised English Health and Social Care system 
NHS Organizations 
 
 NHS Foundation 
Trusts  
Clinical 
Commissioning 
Groups  
General Practices  
Organizational Form Autonomised and 
decentralised 
provider units;  
Public benefit 
corporation with an 
element of 
mutuality; 
 
Commissioning arm 
across local 
populations;  
Local and 
traditionally small 
scale providers of 
primary care 
services; 
Some recent ‘scaling 
up’, mergers and 
acquisitions; 
Financial Flows Mainly public 
money;  
No shareholders or 
dividends; 
BUT can make and 
retain surpluses; 
increased ability to 
raise private income;  
 
Public money; 
Under increasing 
financial stress 
following post 2008 
austerity; 
Mainly public 
money; some private 
practice and ‘spin 
off’ businesses; 
Governance  Two tier board: 
Council of 
Governors and 
powerful main 
Board (Non 
executives and 
executives); 
 
Supervised by 
regulators (Monitor 
and Care Quality 
Commission); 
Membership 
organization for all 
local general 
practices; 
 
Professional 
partnership form; 
Regulated by CCGs 
and the Care Quality 
Commission; 
 
Issues Arising  Different 
governance systems 
and accountabilities; 
which is dominant in 
practice?; 
Strongly supervised 
by NHS England; 
Multiple 
accountabilities; 
which is dominant in 
Who makes major 
decisions? 
Role of partners? 
Role of the regulator 
(CQC)? 
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Collaborative or 
competitive strategy 
locally? 
Strength of systems 
based thinking? 
 
practice? 
Small scale or large 
scale thinking? 
 
 
Further Sectors and Actors 
 
 
 Local Authority  Third sector  
 
Private Sector Health and Well 
Being Boards 
Organizational 
Form 
Democratically 
elected local 
body; 
Party political 
control; 
Not for profits; 
Range of forms: 
NGOs; Social 
enterprises; 
Cooperatives; 
Strong 
volunteer 
element and 
sense of 
mission; 
Private firms: 
diverse range – 
SMES; PLCs, 
MNCs; 
outsourcing 
firms; private 
equity funds 
(e.g. nursing 
home sector) 
Statutory inter 
agency and area 
based 
coordinating 
machinery set 
up by 2012 Act 
for health and 
local 
government 
agencies; 
Financial Flows Local taxation 
plus central 
government 
financialsupport 
Donors; 
Public grants; 
Some private 
income 
generation (e.g. 
charity shops); 
Markets and 
customers; 
Some public 
sector contracts 
for outsourcing 
firms; 
No financial 
responsibilities 
Governance  Councillors; 
Party system; 
Now Cabinet 
System and 
Mayors in some 
areas; 
Boards of 
Trustees; 
Regulated by 
the Charity 
Commission; 
Often Boards of 
Directors who 
report to 
shareholders at 
AGM; 
Regulator; 
Inter agency 
forum; 
 
Issues Arising Strength of 
democratic 
accountability; 
Interaction with 
other ‘non 
democratic’ 
sectors’; 
Key importance 
of adult social 
care function; 
Strength of 
governance 
systems; 
Dependence on 
public grants; 
Shareholder or 
stakeholder 
model? 
Spot contracts 
or relational 
contracts? 
Degree of long 
term or systems 
thinking? 
Degree of 
private and 3rd 
sector 
involvement? 
Degree and 
nature of their 
influence ?  
 
